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Abstract 
 
"Where there is no law, but every man does what is right in his own eyes, there is the least of          
  real liberty" 
          Henry M. Robert 
 
This thesis analyses Russian foreign policy from March 2012 to April 2015 to determine factors 
that influenced its conduct. Neo-classical realism is the theory that first, lays the basis for such 
an elaborate examination and second, narrows the scope of analysis to variables that could have 
had an impact on the strategies of such foreign policies. Therefore the research question 
addressed in this thesis is: What were the driving forces behind Russia's foreign policy between 
2012 and 2015? The analysis of Russian foreign policy can be of prime importance for regional 
energy security in particular, and international peace in general. This study tests the three 
hypotheses utilizing a method such as process tracing and relying heavily on document analysis. 
The findings suggest that security concerns about the preservation of the sphere of influence over 
Ukraine influenced to a great extent Russia's course of actions. Instead of accepting new 
developments, Russia pursued hard-line policies notwithstanding the fact that such strategies had 
a negative economic and political impact on its posture in the international arena. In a few 
words, I would recommend that future research should delve deeper in studying such 
controversial behaviour in a state's foreign policy when a state pursues hard-line policies even 
though it clearly understands that they are self-destructive. In addition, the evidence of this study 
indicates the importance of devising policies and strategies that could enhance reciprocal 
cooperation and prevent states from locking one another into a mutually damaging stalemate 
which deteriorates relations and impedes the maintenance of international peace and security.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
A state's relations with its counterparts as well as non-state actors are of vital importance in the 
field of international relations. Mearsheimer states that every nation, especially great powers, put 
great emphasis on economic and military capabilities they exercise relative to each other since 
they are deeply concerned about security issues (2006:71). Security competition occurs since 
states view the international system as anarchic and as the main rational actors a states' vital task 
is survival (ibid.:73). An important tool in shaping strategies that can increase chances of 
survival in the international structure is a state's foreign policy. Bull notices that foreign policy 
can be viewed as "the rational pursuit of interests of the state which at least in principle at some 
points overlap with the interests of other states (2002:164). However, in the second decade of the 
21th century the Russian Federation and the EU found themselves at odds concerning the issues 
affecting the core national interests of both actors. 
The main purpose of this thesis is the examination of Russian foreign policy. This research 
analyses Russian conduct to uncover the reasons behind the cleavages that occurred between 
Russia and the EU. It is important to note that this thesis does not endeavour to analyze Russia's 
relations with particular European states as it is primarily focused on Russia's conduct per se. 
The central puzzle of this paper is to determine why Russia pursued the strategies of 
reorientation vis-a-vis Western Europe in the second decade of the 21st century despite the fact 
that policies chosen were on the one hand, damaging the image of the Russian political elites and 
on the other hand, they brought about a crisis which nearly caused the Russian economy to 
collapse (Pew Research Center 2014). The period of time from March 2012 to April 2015 is 
examined to draw a pattern of conduct and discover factors that influenced Russian foreign 
policy. The study of this particular time frame is essential since it was the period of volatile 
changes in European region ranging from the removal of the Ukrainian president posing a threat 
to Russian national interests, to the annexation of the Crimean peninsula viewed as a 
phenomenon violating the established norms and principles of Western values (Sakwa 2013: 
209). 
In order to examine Russian foreign policy and address issues raised, this study examines the 
following research question: What were the driving forces behind Russia's foreign policy 
between 2012 and 2015? Along with answering the research question, this paper attempts to test 
several hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that the greater Russian economic and military power 
is, the more likely she is to adopt hard-line policies. The second hypothesis is that the greater the 
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Russian political elite's perceptions of systemic factors to be representing threats, the more likely 
Russia is to adopt hard-line policies. The third and final hypothesis is that the less accountable 
the government is, the more likely Russia is to adopt hard-line policies. These hypotheses are 
based on the assumption that each one has an effect on foreign policy. 
Multiple theories exist that deal with particular foreign policy strategies and some of them are 
indeed of great significance. Many works have been conducted into different states' foreign 
policies, as every state is estimated to have its own foreign policy distinct from others (Telhami 
2002: 158). Nevertheless, notwithstanding a sufficient amount of literature on states' foreign 
policy this area still requires a thorough examination owing to both the unpredictability of the 
state's conduct and the complexity of factors that shape events and form a state's strategies 
(Hudson 1995: 221). Furthermore, diverging views of different scholars' theories make it 
extremely difficult to construct a more or less acceptable model which could explain a state's 
conduct and make necessary further exploration of an integral part of international relations, 
namely foreign policy (Schafer 2003: 171). 
NCR constitutes a theoretical framework of this thesis to test the hypotheses and examine the 
research question. NCR has been chosen to examine Russian foreign policy since it examines 
factors at different levels. Neither classical realism nor neo-realism could have explained 
Russia's conduct and provide a thorough analysis of geo-political developments as they do not 
examine all the necessary variables. Although the distribution of power in European region 
would have remained relatively unchanged with the Ukraine falling into the orbit of the West, 
the Russian government preferred to re-evaluate its relations with the EU and eventually suspend 
them for the time being. The political elites' perceptions of threats in the international system as 
explained by neo-classical realists played a crucial if not decisive role in shaping non-
cooperative Russian foreign policies. My main argument in this study is that the Russian 
government interpreted the overthrow of the Ukraine president as a challenge which would 
diminish its position in the international environment and only then pursued hard-line policies 
however self-destructive they might have been. Without experiencing any resistance from the 
domestic constituencies concerning whether to antagonize and/or even disrupt relations with the 
EU, Russia mobilized all available resources to accomplish its set objectives, namely the 
prevention of the Ukraine from dropping out of the Russia's sphere of influence.    
This thesis consists of the following sections. The first part briefly states the research problem 
and offers an explanation of the purpose of the research. The second section provides a literature 
review which covers the various arguments, controversies, techniques used to analyze what 
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drives a state's foreign policy, findings of different scholars as well as their points of divergence. 
This section also touches upon the theoretical framework of this study, hypotheses tested, and a 
layout of the research design More specifically, I justify case selection, provide methodology and 
the operationalization of variables before discussing material used. The third section presents a 
historical background and factors that brought about a worsening of relations and the subsequent 
implicit conflict between the Russian Federation and the EU. Next, I carry out an elaborate study 
of the findings in regard with the hypotheses in order either to adopt or to reject them. The final 
section of this thesis I start with concluding remarks before addressing the limitations of the 
current study, theoretical and practical implications.  
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Chapter 2  
Framework of Analysis 
2.1 Concept definitions 
Although there are numerous factors that shape a state's foreign policy, this study is particularly 
interested in the generation of foreign policy derived from such indicators as economic and 
military power, political elites' perceptions and the government accountability to the domestic 
public. This section examines in depth both the definitions of these factors as well as that of 
foreign policy to meet this research's goals. It starts with the description of economic and 
military power before moving to political elites' perceptions and the government's accountability. 
Finally, a variety of approaches and arguments that have been conducted in the study of foreign 
policy are reviewed.  
Individuals and groups of people pay great attention to their security. They fear that a lack of 
security makes them vulnerable to domination, exploitation and subjugation (Herz 1950: 157). 
To overcome this fear they start seeking power which in turns sets the ball rolling towards "the 
vicious circle of security and power accumulation"(ibid.). These complex processes of security 
and power accumulation have occupied a considerable number of great minds due to the 
complexity of factors shaping interactions among nations. Such interactions can take the form of 
cooperation or conflict. While the former in many cases brings mutual benefits, the latter may 
result in disruption of relations and lead to catastrophic outcomes. However as Wright notices 
"The essence of the struggle is the competition for the necessities of life that are insufficient to 
satisfy all" (1951: 198).   
Nye (2009) emphasizes that both economic and military power have a great impact on other 
countries' policies. The use of economic and/or military forces to compel or please other states 
remains within a state's intentions (ibid.). Smith (2014) points out that while states still exercise 
the monopoly on military, political and ideological power, economic power is becoming a 
contested area. However, the significance of economic power in international affairs should not 
be underestimated. Whalley defines economic power as "the ability of individual countries, 
groups of countries, or even groups within countries to either compel or persuade other countries 
to act (or at least contemplate acting) as they otherwise would not by the threat or actual use of 
penalties and inducements of various forms" (2009: 4-5). It is also important to note that instead 
of using economic power to persuade or punish a rival state, self-reliant countries often rely on 
military solutions to problems. Maoz points out that "When states are relatively self-reliant, and 
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trade does not make for a major part of their national income, the cost of conflict is reduced and 
the temptation to resolve conflicts of interests through the use of force may be higher" (2006: 
394). 
Similar to economic power, military power can also be used as an instrument of coercion. House 
(2008) states that military power "…provides nation the capability to impose its will on another 
nation through the threat or use of violence. Military force also provides a state "the capability to 
resist another's coercive actions" (ibid.). Driel shares the previous author's opinion saying that 
"military power in the existing cultural environment and time span has in its widest sense, the 
objective to influence attitudes of political and military decision-makers" (1981: 46). 
However, the reliance on military power bears substantial expenditure and poses a threat to 
international peace and security (Jervis 1978). Moreover, a worsening of relations due to the use 
of military means have a negative impact on the international economy (Liff et al. 2014:52). In 
addition, as Jervis says that "most statesmen know that to enter a war is to set off a chain of 
unpredictable and uncontrollable events" (Jervis 1978:177). 
To avoid a conflicting situation it is crucial that state leaders are able to interpret correctly other 
nations' intentions, threats in particular. Political leaders' perceptions in that case play a crucial 
role in whether they view other states' actions to be either benevolent or malignant. Stein defines 
perception as "the process of apprehending by means of the senses and recognizing and 
interpreting what is processed" (Stein 2013: 2). Despite the most advanced technologies the 
civilization has ever had to gather intelligence, the international environment still remains 
blurred. Countries top leaders do not have a complete picture about the genuine motivations or 
strategies other countries pursue. It becomes even worse when state leaders interpret other states' 
accumulation of economic and military power as endangering their national security (ibid). 
Jervis states that "Decision makers act in terms of vulnerability they feel, which can differ from 
the actual situation" (Jervis 1978: 174)  
The main culprit to be blamed is an anarchic structure of the international system where, even 
though states' interests overlap, they continue rivalry (Glaser 1997: 171). This situation is created 
due to the absence of a supranational sovereign who could serve as an enforcer and guarantor of 
compliance with the established norms and international laws (Liff et al. 2014: 62). As a result, 
sovereign states find themselves locked into a predicament explicitly defined by the prominent 
scholar, Robert Jervis, as the security dilemma. It reads as follows:"many of the means by which 
a state tries to increase its security decreases the security of others' (Jervis 1978:168). Therefore, 
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states can go to war when one country's increase of capabilities is understood in terms of a threat 
due to a lack of information and misinterpretation of its true motives (Stein 2013: 3). 
However, the decision to go to war can be limited by such a factor as government accountability. 
Government accountability can be understood in terms of "the obligation of individuals, agencies 
and organisations (public, private and civil society) to submit themselves to another's oversight 
and scrutiny and provide information and justifications for their actions and decisions" (Chene 
2015: 2). There are three types of accountability, namely horizontal, vertical and diagonal. This 
study is interested in vertical accountability which is "the mechanisms through which public 
officials are held accountable to the electorate or citizenry" (ibid.). In a situation when a state's 
leader's hands are not tied by their domestic constituency then it becomes much easier for them 
to mobilize all the available resources at short notice in order to wage war. This opportunity 
exacerbates the danger of misinterpretation of other states' intentions and perceiving them as 
threats.  
One of the efficient means that may enhance the chances of influencing other states decision-
making process, strategies and intentions is foreign policy. In the highly mistrustful environment 
of international relations foreign policy serves as an instrument of transmitting and delivering 
messages implying the change of other states conduct as well as their own to meet the challenges 
of the outside world. It is worth pointing out that "authoritarian systems have greater flexibility 
and capacity to respond to changes in their external environment" (Hermann 1983: 279). 
Furthermore, as Hall notes that in Waltz's opinion "democracies are not as good as authoritarian 
states at foreign policy-making" (Hall 2014: 535).  
Foreign policy of a state as defined by Tayfur is "the behaviour of states mainly towards other 
states in the international system through their authorised agents" (1994: 113). Another 
definition is described by Modelski who states that foreign policy is "the system of activities 
evolved by communities for changing behaviour of other states and for adjusting their activities 
to the international environment (1962: 6). Wright agrees by emphasizing that foreign policy 
"results from the continuous effort of the community either to modify the external environment 
in order to fit its own interests or to modify its interests so as better to fit the changing world-
environment" (1930: 910).  Hermann shows that foreign policy consists of "the plans, goals, and 
actions of national governments directed at entities outside the nation (1983: 269). To 
summarize, foreign policy is such an activity of national governments that enables them both to 
influence the conduct of other states as well as to adjust their conduct in accordance with the 
challenges of the external environment in order to fit the international system. 
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2.2. Review of Research   
Much research on the study of Russian foreign policy utilizing a variety of approaches and 
arguments has been carried out. Their focus has mainly been on Russian foreign policy driven by 
such factors as the possession of abundant gas and oil reserves, gross nuclear arsenal and the 
permanent member seat in the UNSC with the veto power. Having analyzed Russian foreign 
policy, Panagiotou observes that the Russian Federation uses "its permanent membership of the 
Security Council as a strong foreign policy tool and as a means of promoting its national 
interests" (2011: 212). Other analyses indicate that an energy card has been the main driver of 
Russia's foreign policy, while others showed that nuclear weapons have been used by Russian 
political leaders as a political instrument rather than a military one.  
During the study of Russian foreign policy scholars applied different methodologies. 
Kropatcheva (2012), for instance examines Russian foreign policy through the lens of NCR. She 
finds that "improved domestic capabilities together with more self-confidence and restored pride 
lead to a more assertive foreign policy" (ibid.: 38). She adds that despite cleavages with the 
West, Russian foreign policy should not been seen as anti-Western since it is interested in 
cooperation in many of international affairs (ibid.). She concludes her research by stating that 
"neoclassical realism is an expedient theoretical framework for studying Russian foreign policy" 
for various reasons (ibid.). First, it says that the analysis of domestic factors contributes in 
understanding Russia's assertive strategies. Second, the examination of the "international context 
of action" is necessary since Russia mirrors the conduct of the West (ibid.). Lastly, subjective 
factors analyzed by NCR also play an important role.   
Another solution to the study of Russian foreign policy is described in Engstrӧm's work. She 
demonstrates that Russian foreign policy has "deep roots in Russian culture and were formulated 
as political concepts decades ago by relatively small radical right-wing groups" (Engstrӧm 2014: 
375). She finds that although not every single policy generated in the 1990s and 2000s is 
supported by the Kremlin there is great correlation between the policies formulated decades ago 
and actions that were shaping Russia's behaviour in 2013 and 2014 (ibid.). Kubyshkin and 
Sergunin support Engstrӧm's argument emphasizing that the roots of contemporary Russian 
foreign policy should be sought in the 1990s. They carried out a study of Russian foreign policy 
from the 1990s till the second decade of the 21st century. Their findings suggest that Russian 
foreign policy has been shaped by "a unique mixture of geopolitics with the so-called 
civilizational approach" (Kubyshkin et al. 2012: 8). The authors state that the non-recognition of 
Russia as an equal partner and fictitious inclusion of her in various politico-economic and 
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military international institutions provoked the Russian elite to seek policies that were divergent 
from the West's viewpoints (ibid.). 
A very interesting approach to the study of Russian foreign policy has been adopted by Mathers 
(Mathers 2012). In her work she analyses the speeches and other public statements of the two 
Russian presidents, namely Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev from 2000 to 2010. She argues 
that "Russia's position as a major exporter of energy at a time of high global demand and equally 
high prices has given Moscow new foreign-policy leverage that it has not hesitated to use" (ibid.: 
495). Likewise, she asserts that "the foreign-policy discourse of Russia's political leaders has 
continued to make extensive use of Russia's position as a major nuclear weapons state" (ibid.). 
She concludes that both presidents played a nuclear weapons card "as a way of sending signals, 
particularly to the United States and its NATO allies but also to domestic audiences, about 
Russia's foreign-policy orientation" (ibid.: 495-496).  
Another tool of Russian foreign policy has been examined by Varol (2013). He showed how the 
Russian Federation plays its energy card. He emphasized that Russian foreign policy is heavily 
dependent on "its energy weapon capacity" and it uses it either as a tool of hard or soft power 
contingent on the situation (ibid.: 20). He also highlights that "there is an increasing 
interdependency between the EU and Russia due to a high degree of the EU dependency on 
Russian energy exports and Russian dependency to the income from European routes" (ibid: 
393). Newnham (2011) carries out a similar analysis in terms of examining Russia's foreign 
policy through the lens of its energy resources. He notices that Russia's use of its energy leverage 
is two-fold. In other words, Russia's energy clout serves her either to please her allies or to 
exercise hard power towards anti-Russian governments (ibid.: 134). The results obtained by 
Newnham  in his research suggest that due to an increase in gas and oil prices as a result of high-
demand and their scarcity, the Russian Federation's 'petro-power' "has become an increasingly 
clear threat to all the states which buy Russian oil and gas" (ibid.: 142).    
However, the greatest explanation and appropriateness of neoclassical realism for the analysis of 
foreign policy has been provided by Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. 
Taliaferro in their book Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign policy. They say that NCR 
examines:  
 ...why, how and under what conditions the internal characteristics of states- the extractive 
 and mobilization capacity of politico-military institutions, the influence of domestic 
 societal actors and interest groups, the degree of state autonomy from society, and the 
 level of elite or societal cohesion- intervene between the leaders' assessment of 
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 international threats and opportunities and the actual diplomatic, military, and foreign 
 economic policies those leaders pursue (Lobell et al. 2009: 4).  
The authors also emphasize that systemic theory of international relations, such as the neorealist 
balance of power theory as well as the Innenpolitik theory of foreign policy, such as the liberal 
or democratic peace theory lack explanatory power in understanding a powerful state's foreign 
policy (ibid.: 2). Nor can the examination of just relative power and existential threats throw 
light on country's conduct (ibid.: 3). Having examined several state's foreign policies, the 
writers observe that they (policies) were the result of the political leaders' evaluation of external 
challenges, perception of them as threats and subsequent use of resources for the realization of 
their plans. "International imperatives filtered through the medium of state structure and 
affected how top officials assessed likely threats, identified viable strategies in response to those 
threats, and ultimately extracted and mobilized the societal resources necessary to implement 
and sustain those strategies" (ibid.: 3-4). They argue that what is necessary is "the analysis of 
unit-level variables [that] constrain or facilitate the ability of all types of states- great powers as 
well as lesser states - to respond to systemic imperatives" (ibid.). These assumptions are further 
elaborated in details in the theoretical part of this thesis. 
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2.3. Theory and hypotheses 
In this section the key social science theories such as classical realism, neorealism and NCR  are 
analyzed. I start with the discussion of key assumptions of realism before moving to classical 
realism's distinct characteristics. After I explore neorealism and its main features. Next, I carry 
out an examination of NCR and highlight why it has advantages over both classical realism and 
neorealism in the study of Russian foreign policy.  
Realism has several key assumptions. First, nation-states consisting of individuals organized in 
groups are the most important, legitimate, rational and constitutive actors of the international 
system (Lindemann 2014: 33-34). Second, the international system is anarchic and conflict-
driven (ibid.). Third, the central variable in realists' understanding is power (ibid.). They say that 
the state's prime interest is power and, consequently, they are primarily concerned about the 
distribution of relative power in the international politics (ibid.). Moreover, realists think that 
foreign policy consists of actions based on rational behaviour and "calculation of means and ends 
and benefits of alternative courses of action in order to maximize the benefits (Tayfur 1994: 
119).  
Classical realism 
The roots of realism can be found in works compiled by Thucydides, Hobes and Machiavelli 
(Lindemann 2014: 33-34). Hans J. Morgenthau (1961, Edward Carr (1949) and John Herz 
(1951) laid the foundation for classical realism (Lindemann 2014: 33-34). Morgenthau, for 
instance, "emphasized the will to power as an integral part of human nature" (Lindemann 2014: 
34). He states that "…whenever [humans] strive to realize their goal by means of international 
politics, they do so by striving for power" (Morgenthau 1948: 13). The analysis of world affairs 
as assumed by classical realists should be conducted by looking at domestic politics (Lindemann 
2014: 34).  
Neorealism 
Neorealism introduced by Kenneth N. Waltz (1979) built on many assumptions of classical 
realism and transformed it into a theory of international politics (Lindemann 2014: 34). One of 
the central divisions between classical realists and neorealists is the nature of the international 
system. Classical realism is primarily concerned about human nature, whereas neorealism 
examines only the system level. According to Lindemann, "Waltz did not locate the source of 
conflict primarily in human nature and power-seeking individuals, but pointed to the anarchic 
structure of the international system to explain the recurrence of conflicts" (2014: 34). In 
addition, although neorealists recognize the importance of domestic variables in a state's foreign 
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policy, they consider states as 'black boxes' (ibid.).  It is important to note that neorealists fall 
into two camps, namely "defensive neorealists" including Kenneth N. Waltz (1979) arguing that 
"states will be obliged to act to create balances of power to prevent hegemony" and "offensive 
neorealists" including John J. Mearsheimer (2001) who contends that "states are obliged to seek 
at least regional hegemony'' (Brown 2011: 1076).  
Neoclassical realism 
The emergence of NCR "as a new theoretical framework for the analysis of foreign policy" can 
be explained by "the inability of neo-realism to provide an adequate explanation of foreign 
policy behaviour (Schweller 2003, cited in Lindemann 2014: 35). NCR is a mixture of neo-
realism, which focuses primarily on the structure of the international system, and classical 
realism providing analysis at domestic level (Kitchen 2010: 117; Marsh 2014: 121). According 
to Brown, "to understand foreign policy it is necessary to take on board both the relative power 
of the state in question, that is to say its vulnerability to imperative generated by an anarchic 
international system, and domestic factors such as the perceptions of decision makers and the 
capacity of the state to extract and mobilize resources to pursue a given policy" (Brown 2011: 
1076). 
 Rose was the first scholar who coined the term NCR in 1998 (Lobell 2009: 5-6; Ratti 2006: 96). 
Unlike neorealist theories investigating patterns of state interactions, current (NCR) research is 
primarily focused on individual states' conduct offering "complex causal interaction of systemic 
and unit-level variables'' (Coetzee et al. 2012: 272-73; Rose 1998: 145). Neo-classical realists 
put forward the idea that states' foreign policy is subject to their relative power capabilities in the 
international system (Rose 1998: 146). However, they add that relative power, per se, does not 
determine state's foreign policy as "the distribution of capabilities...cannot in and of itself 
provide a comprehensive and accurate account of the foreign policy behaviour of states" 
(Coetzee et al. 2012: 270). It is government officials directly involved in decision-making and 
their perceptions of their country's relative power on the international arena that have an impact 
on foreign policy (Rose 1998: 147). Thus, a NCR theory on foreign policy should be examined 
via the analysis of systemic challenges filtered "through intervening unit-level variables such as 
decision-makers' perceptions and state structure" (Lobell et al. 2009: 7). In other words, it is 
states' relative power capabilities and political elites' perception of those capabilities in 
conjunction with domestic state structure that drives state's foreign policy (Rose 1998: 146). The 
causal logic of neoclassical realism is presented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Neo-classical realism causal logic of state's foreign policy behaviour 
Dependent variable External (systemic) variables Internal (intervening) variables. 
Foreign policy behaviour The distribution of power in 
the international system 
The subjective perceptions of 
decision-makers; The efficiency of 
a country's state apparatus; State-
society relation 
 
Foreign policy = Systemic variables + intervening variables. 
Since domestic state structure can influence a state's foreign policy, neo-classical realists are 
right to point out that states with compatible relative power but varying strength of a country's 
state apparatus are bound to have different foreign policies (Rose 1998: 147). Zakaria lends 
support to this argument claiming that:   
  State power is that portion of national power the government can extract for its  
  purposes and reflects the ease with which central decision-makers can achieve  
  their ends. (Zakaria cited in Rose 1998: 162). 
Similarly, Coetzee et al. (2012:271) stress the importance of a 'state-society' relationship factor 
in determining states' foreign policy behaviour and their respective leaders' perceptions and 
subsequent exploitation of available resources. One of the most interesting approaches to the 
issue of state capacity to extract resources has been proposed by Taliaferro. He emphasizes that 
"the relative ability of the state to extract and mobilize resources from domestic society'' 
influences 'balancing strategies' that countries will choose (2006: 464). He offers three possible 
models that states are likely to adopt: emulation, innovation and persistence in or escalation of 
strategies (ibid.: 486). The scholar notices when a government can mobilize all available 
resources and act without facing any form of coherent domestic public opposition, it allows the 
state to exert more influence abroad and pursue more aggressive foreign policies (ibid.:488).  
Conversely, a weak country's apparatus, which is highly likely to affect and weaken to a great 
degree respective state's relative power, can prevent countries from advancing their sphere of 
influence (Ratti 2006: 96). As Coetzee (2012: 270) notes ''relative material power provides both 
opportunities and constraints for state behaviour in the international realm." Overall,  systemic 
pressures and the distribution of power in the international system determine a state's foreign 
policy behaviour once they have been filtered through internal elements, such as policy leaders' 
perceptions subject to their degree of exerting influence on their nation (Rose 1998). However, it 
19 
 
is the political elite, not states, who determines foreign policy (Yoo 2012: 323). Kitchen (2010: 
143) shares the neo-classical realists' perspective stressing: 
 For neo-classical realists then, the international system is not the determining monolith... 
 the structure of the international system as providing states with information about costs 
 and benefits of particular courses of actions, but how that information is processed and 
 weighed depends on the way states understand the world, their preferences, their ideas 
 and their ethics. 
Overall,  NCR does not dispute the basic assumptions of classical realism and neorealism, such 
as the international politics to be driven by states constantly seeking power, anarchy to be the 
main component of the international system, and states to be the main actors striving for 
providing security to themselves (Lobell et al. 2009: 4). Nevertheless, NCR is preferable for the 
study of foreign policy as it "systematically connects structural and unit-level variables in its 
analysis" (Lindemann 2014: 35). Another advantage of NCR according to Lobell et al. (2009: 4) 
is that it presents "an imperfect 'transmission belt' between systemic incentives and constraints, 
on the one hand, and the actual diplomatic, military, and foreign economic policies states select 
on the other". The key assumptions of classical realism, neorealism and NCR are summarized in 
Table 1 found in Lindemann (2014: 35). 
Table 1: Classical Realism, Neo-Realism, and Neoclassical Realism 
Source: Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman 2009: 20. 
Research 
program 
Epistemology and 
methodology 
View of the 
international system 
View of the units Dependent 
variable 
Underlying causal logic 
CLASSICAL 
REAIISM 
Inductive theories; 
philosophical reflection on 
nature of politics or detailed 
historical analysis (generally 
drawn from W. European 
history) 
Somewhat 
important 
Differentiated Foreign policies  
of states 
Power distributions or 
distribution of interests 
(revisionist vs. status quo) —• 
foreign policy 
NEOREALISM Deductive theories; 
competitive hypothesis testing 
using qualitative and 
sometimes quantitative 
methods 
Very important; 
inherently competitive 
and uncertain 
Undifferentiated International 
political 
outcomes 
Relative power distributions 
(independent variable) —• 
international outcomes 
(dependent variable) 
NEOCLASSICAL 
REALISM 
Deductive theorizing; 
competitive hypothesis testing 
using qualitative methods 
Important; implications 
of anarchy are variable 
and sometimes opaque 
to decision-makers 
Differentiated Foreign policies  
of states 
Relative power distributions 
(independent variable) —• 
domestic constraints and elite 
perceptions (intervening 
variables) —♦ foreign policy 
(dependent variable) 
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The main drawbacks of NCR are in relation to the first, domestic level variables which 
Lindemann emphasizes "have simply been incorporated in an ad hoc manner and then used to 
explain away the anomalies of structural realism" (2014: 39). Second, he says that "NCR have 
been accused of lacking the parsimony and precision in predictive power that allow the 
falsification of hypotheses" (ibid.). Waltz stresses that a key limitation of NCR is a wide range of 
variables operationalized to analyze a state's foreign policy conduct which may transform an 
explanatory analysis into a descriptive one (Waltz cited in Coetzee et al. 2012: 272). Rosato 
indicates another drawback in the NCR theory arguing that "the prioritization of perceptions as 
an intervening variable lacks empirical validation" (2005: 468). His argument is supported by 
Rose who observes that "the link between objective material power capabilities and 
policymakers' subjective assessment of them remains murky" (1998: 168). He then adds that in 
order to understand states leaders' perceptions one should know both in theory and practice many 
aspects of the socio-economic and political life of the country in question (ibid: 166). However, 
Lobell et al. provide an argument in favour of neoclassical realism stating that "The strength of a 
neoclassical realist framework lies in the problem-driven approach that maintains a focus on the 
political in the study of international politics in order to enhance explanatory power" (Lobell et 
al. 2009: 298-299, cited in Lindemann 2014: 41).  
The literature on NCR shows a variety of approaches scholars have applied to test its 
assumptions. Onea's (2012) focus of research was on US expansion in the Post-Cold War era 
through a neo-classical realism lens. He found that US foreign policy was mainly shaped by 
international interactions with other states and the US political elite perceptions of other states' 
conduct. Likewise, Marsh (2014) carried out research to find out what roles domestic elements 
and policy-makers perceptions played in launching an operation in Libya in 2011. He tested the 
events in question by applying NCR theory. The results obtained by Marsh in his analysis 
suggest that "the nature of US intervention was heavily influenced by domestic politics and elite 
perceptions" (2014: 131). Compared to Onea and Marsh whose unit of analysis was sovereign 
state foreign policy conduct, Ratti (2006: 101-102) studied non-state actor strategies, such as 
NATO and showed that NCR theory have a great explanatory power in explaining a state's 
foreign policy. He found that after the Russian Federation changed its perception over NATO it 
allowed its enlargement into Eastern Europe.  
However, the most interesting approach to testing states' foreign policy conduct via NCR has 
been proposed by Choi. In his work he observes and explains weak states' interactions with 
powerful ones in an asymmetrical power struggle. He arrives at the conclusion that weak states 
do not necessarily collaborate when they are threatened by a more powerful country but instead 
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rely on strategies of resistance however damaging they might be (Choi 2007: 108). Finally, Yoo 
carries out a comparative study applying NCR to examine a ''causal effect of domestic politics on 
states' policy behaviour" (2012: 344). In his work it was shown that despite the fact that Japan 
and South Korea share similar characteristics in terms of allies and threats they adopted different 
foreign policies owing to varying political leadership perceptions and domestic public 
constraints.  In this literature review several applications of NCR theories have been proposed. It 
has been found that NCR has power in explaining state's foreign policy conduct through 
operationalizing such variables as countries' relative power on the world stage as well as political 
elite's perceptions and their ability to exert influence on domestic public. Therefore, NCR is 
highly likely to be able to explain Russian foreign policy since as Paul Kubicek notices 
"...concerns about relative power and international constraints and opportunities do better to 
explain actual changes in Russian policy (Kubicek 1999-2000: 567). Therefore, this thesis 
attempts to test the following hypotheses: 
 Hypothesis 1: The greater Russian economic and military power is, the more likely she is 
 to adopt hard-line policies. 
 Hypothesis 2: The greater the Russian political elite's perceptions of systemic factors to 
 be representing threats, the more likely Russia is to adopt hard-line policies. 
 Hypothesis 3: The less accountable the government is, the more likely Russia is to adopt 
 hard-line policies. 
In the next section, the justification of case selection, methodology applied, operationalization of 
variables necessary to test the hypotheses as well as the sources of data and data itself are 
described.  
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2.4. Research design 
2.4.1. Case Selection 
The research into Russian foreign policy can be of particular relevance for various reasons. 
Being both a major nuclear power and energy exporter, Russian foreign policy is highly likely to 
have a great impact on international peace and energy security (Freeman 2014). It is true that the 
Russian Federation has a great arsenal of nuclear forces which it can use as a tool of foreign 
policy in negotiations (Figure 2). 
         Figure 2. Russian nuclear forces 2015. 
 
        Source: Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris 2015: 85. 
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In addition, the UNSC's veto power and its government regime enable the Russian elite to act 
equivocally. Although it can assist in mutually beneficial cooperation, when considered 
necessary, it can take advantage and be a spoiler in many pending issues with an international 
dimension requiring an urgent involvement and resolution (ibid.). Furthermore, the veto power 
of the UNSC enables Russia not to be bypassed in international affairs.  
Take for instance Iran with its long-lasting negotiations on its nuclear programme where Russia's 
role is not sufficiently ascertained and it can either assist or in contrast derail the attempts of the 
international community regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Taking into 
account the role Iran plays in the Middle East, it will be vital to seek Russia's support in helping 
to curb Iran's nuclear programme. Otherwise, the region where tensions are already at an extreme 
point may turn into an uncontrollable area. This in turn may make the further extraction of 
energy resources in the Middle East extremely difficult making the lives of heavily energy 
dependent countries unbearable (Blix 2012:25). Spassky lends support to this argument 
emphasizing that "Nuclear energy and military conflicts are incompatible because of the nature 
of the nuclear power plant" (2013:7). Without doubt fossil fuel possession is another powerful 
tool in the hands of the Russian Federation to influence states or a group of states such as the EU 
which is heavily dependent on energy imports and therefore she is deeply concerned about her 
energy security (Figure 3).  
                     Figure 3. The EU's import of gas from Russia in 2012.  
 
                  Source:  The Financial Times
1
 
There are also challenges to international energy security since overproduction of gas and oil 
                                                          
1 http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/global-risk-insights/eu-takes-steps-toward-energy-independence-from-
russia 
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poses a threat to oil-exporting countries, whereas cuts in energy supplies present a real danger 
for energy-dependent countries. Russia can use this tool even more effectively, given the fact 
that problems in the Middle East may reach the point of no return.  
Similarly, holding veto power (Table 2) in the UNSC allows Russia to make decisions which are 
politically motivated and thus she interprets international law in a way that suits her core 
interests (Aral 2012: 226). Moreover, by the very same token Russian foreign policy helps the 
world community hold accountable irresponsible international leaders when their punishment 
benefits Russia's strategic objectives. In contrast, Russia can fiercely oppose 
Table 2: UN Security Council 2015 
Permanent 
Members 
China France Russian 
Federation 
The United 
Kingdom 
The United States  
Ten non-
permanent 
members 
(Elected for two-
year terms by the 
General 
Assembly with 
end of term date) 
Angola (2016) 
 
Chad (2015) 
 
Chile (2015) 
 
Jordan (2015) 
 
Lithuania (2015) 
 
Malaysia (2016) 
 
New Zealand 
(2016) 
 
Nigeria (2015) 
 
Spain (2016) 
 
Venezuela 
(Bolivarian 
Republic of) 
(2016) 
 
Source: Table based on data obtained from UN
2
  
the international community when they attempt to sanction and punish a problematic state with a 
pro-Russian orientation through UNSC' resolutions, such as has been the case with Syria 
(Gladstone 2012). Finally, the government regime enables Russia to strike deals with states with 
poor human rights records, such as the Russia-China gas deal, increase cooperation and sell 
WMDs which may empower them in confrontation with the West (Figure 4). 
          Figure 4. Russian Political System.  
 
                    Source: The Telegraph3 
                                                          
2
 http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/ 
3
 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/rbth/politics/8926401/Russias-political-system.html>. 
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Consequently, an elaborate analysis of Russian foreign policy may assist the world in better 
understanding and projecting its responses so as how to preserve international peace and energy 
security. It is essential to avoid worsening of relations which cause instability and disorder, and 
have fearful consequences for the region in particular and the world in general.  
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2.4.2. Methodology 
The analysis of Russia's foreign policy is conducted to explore the main research question: What 
were the driving forces behind Russia's foreign policy between March 2012 and April 2015? The 
Russian Federation is the primary unit of analysis and her foreign policies are the dependent 
variables. This study will be qualitative and a method such as process-tracing that provides an 
explanation for causal relationships between independent and dependent variables will be 
conducted (Collier 2011: 824). A key social science theory such as NCR is the main analytical 
tool of this thesis. According to Lindemann (2014: 38) "Neoclassical realist studies usually 
employ a methodological approach consisting of case studies, historical and analytical narratives, 
and the identification of causal mechanisms between causes and outcomes (process tracing)." 
The case study of Russian foreign policy will be conducted from March 2012 to April 2015 for 
answering the research question and testing the hypotheses. Tayfur (1994: 125-126) states that 
every country has its own distinct foreign policy due to its history and culture and the case study 
approach is better since it "insists on the uniqueness of the foreign policies of each state." It is 
clear that a key limitation of any case study is that its results may not be applied to a general 
pattern. However, by analyzing Russian foreign policy before and after the Ukraine crisis, this 
research may discover vital factors influencing Russia's policies of reorientation and re-
evaluations of relations with Western Europe which might have been neglected through 
generalisations of states' different foreign policies (ibid.: 126). This research is particularly 
interested in Russia's conduct and why she pursued policies of re-evaluation of relations vis-a-vis 
the EU. Some sources say that the Ukraine crisis is the worst one between the West and Russia 
since the end of the Cold War (BBC 2015). Therefore, it is highly likely that the Ukraine crisis 
may have had a great impact on reorientation of Russian foreign policy behaviour towards the 
EU.   
It is important to explain why this thesis examines the period of time from 2012 to April 2015 to 
draw a pattern of conduct and discover what impact the political leaders' perceptions had on 
Russian foreign policy. The study of this particular time frame is essential since it was the period 
of volatile changes in European region ranging from the Russian presidential elections in 2012, 
the removal of the Ukrainian president in 2014 posing a threat to Russian national interests and 
instigating the Ukraine crisis, to the annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 2014 viewed as a 
phenomenon violating international laws and endangering the established norms and principles 
in the EU. In addition, Tayfur (1994: 137) states: 
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 Crises are situations where an (unanticipated) threat is directed to high priority goals of a 
 state which in turn require action in a short time. During crisis periods decision makers 
 are under great stress and this affects their perceptions and ability to act differently than 
 under normal conditions. Moreover, since crises mostly become turning points either in 
 the history of individual states or in the working international system, they occupy an 
 important place in the study of foreign policy.  
It is evident that Russia is one of the main actors having high stakes in the Ukraine crisis. Taking 
into account the fact that the Ukraine crisis was acknowledged to be the worst since the end of 
the Cold War, the study of Russian foreign policy in the period preceding the Ukraine crisis and 
during it may present an interesting case for an analysis. 
The analysis is conducted in the following way. First, the prominent neo-classical realists' works 
are reviewed to determine assumptions they provide and which variables in particular should be 
examined. Next, hypotheses tested in this thesis are formulated based on knowledge obtained 
from neoclassical realists' literature. Third, literature review that defines the main concepts of 
this paper is carried out. Then, research carried out in the study of Russian foreign policy by 
various scholars is examined in order to discover factors that drove Russia's foreign policy in 
past as well as methodologies and approaches these scholars adopted to accomplish the research 
objectives. Likewise, works of different scientists which examined different states' foreign 
policies, including Russia's, by using neoclassical realism as a theoretical framework of their 
analysis are reviewed. Next, the operationalization of the dependent variables as well as the 
sources of data, and what data in particular is analyzed is described to answer the research 
question and test the hypotheses. Finally, in the concluding chapter the findings and limitations 
of this study obtained by applying the current research design are highlighted. 
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2.4.3. Operationalization 
On the basis of a social science theory, namely NCR and research on various factors affecting a 
state's foreign policy, the following independent variables were selected to determine forces 
behind Russian foreign policy behaviour: Russia's economic and military power, the political 
elites' perceptions of systemic factors, and last but not least the government accountability 
determining the government capacity to mobilize available resources without facing any 
constraints from the general public. It is a well known fact that Russia is heavily dependent on 
revenues from gas and oil exports as revenues are vital for the Russian economy (Vatansever 
2010: 5). Therefore, the prices on hydrocarbons may have both positive and negative impact on 
Russian economy in particular, and military in general; one the one hand, if the prices are high 
then it empowers Russia's economy; on the other hand, if prices are low then it should have a 
negative impact and weaken Russia's economy. 
Russia's economic and military power which it might have used to influence other states' leaders 
are measured via GDP, hydrocarbon's prices and the defense budget, respectively. However, 
Treverton and Jones state that GDP "provides a limited picture [of economic] power since it does 
not draw an explicit picture of the state's economic composition" (2005: 5). By the same token, 
the defence budget may not be the best indicator of military power providing misleading 
conclusions. Therefore, for the sake of a robust analysis a researcher should operationalize a 
state's economic and military power through other indicators in order to gather more reliable 
data. However, it is beyond the scope of the current thesis due to the time constraints. Thus, the 
measurement of Russia's military and economic power is limited to GDP and the defense budget 
data, except data of hydrocarbon' prices. 
Next, I analyze the intervening variable, namely the political elite's perceptions of systemic 
factors, in particular challenges and pressures interpreted by Russian leaders as threats. 
According to Hermann (1983: 282), "Systemic variables refer to characteristics of the entire 
international system and have the same value (although not necessarily the same implications) 
for all members of the system (e.g., the amount of conflict occurring in the world at any given 
time)."  These perceptions are generalized as statesmen views.  They are measured through an 
elaborate examination of Russian political leaders' public speeches and statements on Russia's 
foreign policy strategies which were made between March 2012 and April 2015. The period of 
the analysis starts in March 2012 marking the election of Vladimir Putin, the president of the 
Russian Federation, and his first address to the general public on March 5
th
 2012 (Owen 2012, 
The Economist 2012). The analysis ends in April 2015 marking the president's latest perception 
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of systemic factors as threats to Russia (The Guardian 26 April 2015). In conjunction with the 
speeches and statements, the examination of the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian 
Federation approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on 12 February 2013 
laying out "the major official Russian statements about foreign policy" is conducted (Mathers 
2012: 496, MFA of Russia 2013).  
However, the effect of this intervening variable can be less robust since leaders' perceptions 
expressed via statements and press releases can be politically motivated and therefore will not 
represent actual attitudes. This drawback is compensated by encompassing a period of four 
years. According to Mathers, "An examination of all the statements made on a particular topic 
over a lengthy period can, however, reveal patterns and trends that might be overlooked when 
focusing only on a small number of high-profile speeches. (2012: 514-515). Furthermore, 
neoclassical realists' assumptions state that foreign policy is generated after systemic variables 
have been filtered through political leaders' perceptions and consequently they may have affected 
the policies and strategies Russia pursued. 
Another intervening variable, that is the government accountability, is generalized as public 
control. It is measured by analyzing datasets containing information on voice and accountability 
per country as well as the level of corruption. The measurement of this variable is necessary for 
the establishment of the Russia political leaders' accountability and extent to which they exerted 
influence on the domestic constituencies. As indicated in the World Bank's report about state-
society synergy of accountability: "... a powerful accountability structure… holds every public 
official responsible for his/her actions as a public servant" (The World Bank 2004: 7). In 
addition, scholarly articles touching upon public support in the period in question as well as what 
resistance the Russian leaders experienced from the local public are reviewed. Domestic 
pressures present at the time of the analyzed period are examined since as proposed by Fearon 
(1998) and assumed by neoclassical realists they may affect a state's foreign policy.   
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2.4.3. Data 
GDP, hydrocarbon's prices and the defense budget 
The data for the qualitative measures used in this thesis is collected for the analysis of Russia's 
foreign policy behaviour. Economic power's proxies, GDP and hydrocarbon's prices, data in the 
period of 2012 and 2015 are obtained from Minfin Russia 2015 and CBR 2015. Military power's 
proxy, military expenditure, data is collected from SIPRI 2015.  
The Russian political elite's perceptions  
Data about Russian political leaders' perceptions are obtained from secondary sources, namely 
scholarly articles, books as well as prominent media sources, such as the BBC, CSIS, the 
Economist, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the Guardian, the Stratfor, the RT, Izvestia, and 
Tass. In addition to secondary sources, I also examine data from primary sources. The Kremlin's 
official website is one such source and presents a reliable one, where official public statements 
of the Russian leaders relating to foreign policy issues are presented with no access restrictions. 
Another source to analyze official Russian government documents, such as the Concept of the 
Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2013 where Russia's foreign policy's objectives are 
circumscribed is available on the Russian Foreign Ministry website on a free basis.  
The government accountability, public resistance and support 
The data necessary for the analysis of this variable is gathered from the WB dataset, namely The 
Worldwide Governance Indicators, the section evaluating voice and accountability per country in 
particular. According to the World Bank it "Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a 
country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media" (World Bank 2015). Another source is the 
Corruption Perception Indices 2012, 2013, and 2014, in which data about the level of corruption 
present in the Russian Federation is illustrated. Political corruption decreases the level of 
political accountability due to the lack of information citizens are delivered (Adsera et al. 2003: 
448).   I also, examine various pieces of scholarly research on Russian domestic public support 
and resistance towards the Russian leaders carried out between 2012 and 2015. The following 
section contains the findings obtained by examining the variables identified in the current part of 
the thesis. Next, the summarizing section presents the results of the examination before turning 
to the concluding section. Finally, the concluding part of the thesis analyses the findings, the 
main research question and the hypothesis of this study. 
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Chapter 3 
3.1 Historical Background   
This section presents a historical background which touches upon the independent variables 
analyzed in this thesis to answer the research question and test the hypotheses. It starts with an 
explanation of the documents, institutions, actors, and strategic objectives that contribute to 
designing Russia's foreign policy. Then it discusses the main drivers of Russia's foreign policy 
before and during the Ukraine crisis, such as her economic and military power, the political 
leaders' perceptions of threats, as well as domestic public support and opposition. Finally, the 
findings are discussed in the concluding section. 
On March 4
th
2012, at the presidential elections, Vladimir Putin was elected as the next president 
of the Russian Federation (The Economist 05 March 2012). The centrality of Russian president's 
role in designing a state's foreign policy is inalienable. Article 80 and 86 of the Constitution of 
the Russian Federation delegates the President with the right to "determine the guidelines of the 
internal and foreign policies of the State [and] to govern the foreign policy of the Russian 
Federation."
4
 Although the Russian MFA is formally charged with creation and realization of 
foreign policy, its role in shaping Russia's foreign policy strategy has been diminished 
significantly and limited to implementing policies generated in the Kremlin (Bilyana 2014: 180).  
Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation
5
 signed by Vladimir Putin on February 12, 
2013, for instance, contains the main strategies and objectives of Russia's foreign policy, namely 
''Guarantee the safety of the country, protecting its territorial integrity and sovereignty, ensuring 
its standing position in the international community as one of the influential and competitive 
poles in today's world" (Gonzalez 2013: 3) The protection of her core interests such as securing 
its sphere of influence over post-Soviet space has become top priority goal for Russia as a 
regional power since the collapse of the Soviet Union (Leichtova 2014: 7, Hancock 2007: 94, 
Fetisova 2012). The ongoing Ukraine crisis, which Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov 
called "artificially created", is a result of the realization of such an objective, namely maintaining 
influence on Ukraine in the orbit of the Russian Federation (Lakymenko 2014). 
It is a well known fact that Russia is a leading exporter of oil and gas. Therefore, one of the main 
drivers of Russia's foreign policy is her economic power in the form of its energy leverage. In 
this thesis Russian economic power is measured by looking at GDP and hydrocarbon prices. 
                                                          
4
 Chapter 4, Article 80 and 86, "The Constitution of the Russian Federation" available at http://www.constitution.ru/. 
5
 "Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation" available at http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC 
168189ED44257B2E0039B16D. 
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Russia's GDP (Table 3) rose from 62218.4 billion rubles in 2012 to 66193.7 billion rubles in 
2013 before falling sharply to 52392.6 billion rubles in 2014 which is tantamount to 
approximately 2.017 trillion USD
6
, 2.097 trillion USD, and 1.660 trillion USD, respectively.  
Table 3: Gross Domestic Product Rates, 2012 - 2014 
 
Source:  Table based on data provided by Ministry of Finance of the RF  
 
Compared to GDP, there was a steady decline in oil and gas prices between 2012 and 2014. 
Average oil prices, for instance, decreased from 103,14 in 2012 to 100,41 a barrel in 2013 and 
continued falling to 94,22 in 2014 (Table 4).  
Table 4: Exports of Russian Oil for 2012-2014 
Year Total (m/t) Value million 
USD 
Non CIS (m/t) CIS (m/t) Average 
Price of 
Export 
USD/bbl 
2012 240 180929,7 211,6 28,4 103,14 
2013 236.6 173669,6 208,0 28,7 100,41 
2014 223.4 153887,9 199,3 24,1 94,22 
Source: Table based on data provided by Central Bank of Russia 2015  
Gas prices followed the same trend declining from  348.33 in 2012 to 342.99 in 2013 and by 
around 26 USD in the following year reaching the point of 317.00 in 2014 (Table 5) 
Table 5: Exports of Russian gas for 2012-2014 
 
Year Total (bcm) Value million 
USD 
Non CIS 
(bcm) 
CIS (bcm) Average Price 
of Export 
USD/1000 cm 
2012 178,7 62253,3 112,7 66,0 348,33 
2013 196,4 67232,3 138,0 58,4 342,29 
2014 174,3 55240,3 126,2 48,0 317,00 
Source: Central Bank of Russia  
However, it is important to note that in the second half of the 2014 oil prices plunged to around 
40 USD per barrel (Figure 5). According to Plumer (2015), on January 23, 2015 "the price of 
Brent crude was… down to 49$ per barrel."  
              
    
                                                          
6
World Bank available at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx 
Year 2012 2013 2014 
Billion Rubles 62218,4 66193,7 52392,6 
33 
 
    Figure 5: Oil prices between 2014 and 2015 
 
                   Source: NASDAQ. 
     
 
Being a major energy supplier allows Russia to use one of the instruments of her economic 
power, namely her energy card as an effective tool of its foreign policy. Many states, including 
members of the EU are heavily dependent on Russia's energy supplies, which she has been using 
as a tool of foreign policy to influence the EU's conduct. In fact, Russia in its turn is dependent 
on the revenues earned from such supplies (Aron 2013, Vášáryová 2015: 111). Despite such 
interdependence EU and Russia found themselves at odds while engaging in the Ukraine affair. 
While the former is a promoter of ''human right and openness'', the latter puts a great emphasis 
on her monopoly on power within her ''semiauthoritarian regime in democratic clothing" 
(Krastev 2009, Evans 2012: 239).  The clash of interests over Ukraine generated what later 
would be named as "the worst East-West crisis since the Cold War, after Ukraine's pro-Moscow 
president Viktor Yanukovych was driven from power by violent protests in Kiev" on February 
22 2014. (BBC News 2015, Booth 2014).  
Shortly after the coup, the Russian president mobilized Russian military forces to take an active 
part in the Crimean peninsula's internal affairs (Lantier 2015, Mearsheimer 2014). This was a 
demonstration of another driver of Russia's foreign policy that is its military power. It is 
measured through an analysis of her defense budget. It is worth pointing out that Russia is 
among the top 3 countries with the largest military expenditure (Figure 6). In addition, if Russia 
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is evaluated in terms of military capacity then its "status falls only slightly below that of the 
United States" (Hancock: 2007: 94)    
 Figure 6: Top ten military expenditures 
 
 Source: Plumer, Brad. "America’s Staggering Defense Budget, in Charts." 2013 
In 2012 Russia's military expenditure was just above 81 billion USD or 4% of its GDP while this 
figure in 2013 rose by more than 6 billion reaching the amount of around 88 billion USD which 
was 4.2% of her GDP. Although in 2014 Russia's defense budget accounted for 4.5% of its GDP, 
compared to 2013 it decreased in terms of USD to approximately 85 billion USD (Table 6).  
Table 6: Military expenditure, in current US$ m., 2012-2014 
Year 2012 2013 2014 
M/USD 81079 87831 84462 
% of GDP 4.0 4.2 4.5 
Source:  Table based on data provided by Stockholm International Peace Research  
    Institute (SIPRI)  
 
Taking into account Russia's military potential, it comes as no surprise that the realization of 
plans in securing control over the Crimea was not a difficult task. Furthermore, Russia has had a 
naval base in the Crimean port of Sevastopol since time immemorial and a great number of her 
troops were already deployed there during the Ukraine crisis which rendered this operation even 
more realistic (Mearsheimer 2014, Lakymenko 2014, BBC News 13 March 2015). In addition, 
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the Russian president confessed in a documentary film "Crimea. The Road Back Home,”7 shown 
in March 2015 that Russia was ready to engage in a nuclear war (Lantier 2015).  
Another expression of Russia's military power culminated, first, in the provision of "advisers, 
arms, and diplomatic support to the Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine'' and, second, in the 
deployment of substantial number of soldiers on the Ukraine border to send a message to a new 
Ukrainian government that in case of attacks on pro-Russian Eastern Ukrainians Russian 
President will authorize invasion (Mearsheimer 2014). Pifer emphasizes that "Russia's use of its 
military to seize Crimea, fuel Ukrainian separatism and invade Donbas broke the cardinal rule of 
the European security order: states should not use military force to take territory from 
neighbours" (2015: 120).  In order to understand why Russia pursued such assertive policies one 
needs to analyze the underlying causes of the Ukraine crisis. They might have been the result of 
tensions that have been growing between Russia and the West over many burning issues of the 
international dimension. Take for example the wide disagreement about the Syrian crisis, in 
which  Russia has opposed humanitarian intervention and used its veto power in the UNSC (the 
only legitimate body which can authorize the use of force to maintain international peace and 
security) to block resolution about invasion (Yusin 2012, Holly 2013). Russia's objection to 
impose sanctions on Syria came under harsh criticism and condemnation from the West (Gabbatt 
2012; Al Jazeera 2012). Nevertheless, Russia was ready to bear the costs of confrontation with 
the West since the Russian leaders feared that it was not a question of Syrian President Bashar 
and his political system's survival but that of their own (Holly 2013).    
Another stumbling block between Russia and the West has been NATO's expansion in post-
Soviet sphere of influence, namely Eastern Europe. Russia has expressed numerous times her 
concerns about NATO's policies in Eastern Europe. These concerns were outlined in a new 
version of the Russian Federation Military Doctrine
8
 which was approved by Russian President 
Vladimir Putin on 26 December 2014 (Engel 2014). This doctrine identifies NATO's buildup and 
destabilization of several regions as the main threat to Russia's national security (Burilkov 2013: 
1045, Goure 2014: 70). Chapter 2, Article 12 of the Russian Federation Military Doctrine states 
that the main external threats are "NATO's expansion and its endowment with global decision-
making power in violation of international law, as well as the destabilization of countries 
adjacent to Russia by overthrowing legitimate public authorities and the establishment of 
governments whose policies threaten the Russian Federation interests" (The Kremlin 26 
                                                          
7
 “Crimea. The Road Back Home,” available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t42-71RpRgI 
8
" The Russian Federation Military Doctrine" available at 
http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf 
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December 2014). It also says that in case of aggression against Russia it instructs armed forces to 
mobilize and use nuclear weapons (Engel 2014, RT News 2014).  
Thus, the overthrow of Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovich and the establishment of a new 
government with anti-Russian policies presented a threat to both Russia's interest and its national 
security. Moreover, the Russian political leaders' strong belief that the coup was backed by 
Berlin and Washington ignited a new wave of tensions between Russia and the West (Lantier 
2015). Vladimir Putin at the Russian Security Council meeting held on 22 July 2014 said that 
"undesirable regimes… get destabilised" by applying tools such as ''colour revolutions, or, in 
simple terms - takeovers instigated and financed outside" (The Kremlin 22 July 2014). This 
statement was the reiteration of what he had said on March 4 2014 "…my assessment of what 
happened in Kiev and in Ukraine in general. There can only be one assessment: this was an anti-
constitutional takeover, an armed seizure of power" (The Kremlin 4 March 2014). Furthermore, 
the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov expressed the opinion that Obama's remarks about 
the transition of power in Ukraine are "proof that from the very beginning, the United States was 
involved in the antigovernment coup that Obama neutrally described as a 'power transition'' (The 
TASS 2015; The RadioFreeEurope  2015). 
As a result, not only did Russia mobilize its troops in the Crimea, but it also supported the 
Crimean parliament in its attempt to hold a referendum. On 16 March 2014, the Crimean 
population was asked whether they wanted to become part of the Russian Federation or they 
wanted to "return to the 1992 Constitution entitled Crimea to full sovereign powers in terms of 
establishing relations with other States..."
9
. Subsequently, almost 97% of the voters at the 
referendum voted for the first option (Blockmans 2014). As a result, Crimea seceded 
unilaterally, proclaimed independence and asked
10
 the Russian government if it can become part 
of the Russian Federation.
11
 On 18 March 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed 
State Duma deputies, Federation Council members, heads of Russian regions and civil society 
representatives in the Kremlin about Crimea becoming a subject of the Russian Federation.
12
 In 
his speech he emphasized Russia's vision of international affairs. He said that "Key international 
institutions are not getting any stronger; on the contrary in many cases, they are sadly degrading. 
Our Western partners, led by the United States of America, prefer not to be guided by 
                                                          
9
 International Law and Legality of Secession in Crimea, 2014: Cambridge Journal of International and 
Comparative Law (CJICL) available at: http://cjicl.org.uk/2014/04/20/international-law-legality-secession-crimea/>. 
10
 "Ukraine Crisis: Crimean MPs Ask to Join Russia, 2014: BBC News available at 
htpp://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26477848>. 
11
 International Law and Legality of Secession in Crimea, 2014: Cambridge Journal of International and 
Comparative Law (CJICL) available at: http://cjicl.org.uk/2014/04/20/international-law-legality-secession-crimea/>. 
12 Address by President of the Russian Federation , March 18, 2014, 15:50,  The Kremlin, Moscow available at: 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603 
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international law in their practical policies, but by the rule of the gun" (The Kremlin 18 March 
2014). He also added that the transition of Ukrainian President was "actions aimed against 
Ukraine and Russia and against Eurasian integration" (ibid.). Similarly, Vladimir Putin noticed 
that the imposition of sanctions by the West to threaten Russia is "the infamous policy of 
containment, led in the 18
th
, 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries" which, in fact, takes place today as well 
(ibid.). However, he warned that "If you compress the spring all the way to its limit, it will snap 
back hard "(ibid.).  Among others he draws particular attention to Ukraine's declarations about 
joining NATO which would present "not an illusory but a perfectly real threat to the whole of 
southern Russia" (ibid.). In concluding remarks he asked the Federal Assembly to consider and 
support the acceptance of Crimea as "this is a matter for Russia’s own political decision, and any 
decision here can be based only on the people’s will, because the people is the ultimate source 
of all authority"(ibid.). 
The acceptance of Crimea drove a wedge between Russia and the EU setting up a trend of 
mutually damaging interactions. The fragile "truce" that has been established since the end of the 
Cold War between Russia and the West enabled the former to improve relations with the EU 
creating conditions for mutually beneficial cooperation. However, Russia's strategy in the 
Ukraine crisis put an end to collaboration and endangered the preservation of security in the 
European region. While the EU pursued the policies containing the promotion of the rule of law 
and democracy by backing up the government transition in the Ukraine, Moscow substantiated a 
claim that "the entire space of the former Soviet Union [is] a zone of the Kremlin's special 
geostrategic interest, from which outside political - and even economic- influence should be 
excluded" (Brzezinski 1997: 136).  Crimea's annexation was interpreted by the West as illegal 
and a violation of international norms and principles. According to Smith and Eschenko, 
"German Chancellor Angela Merkel has said that the so-called referendum and the acceptance of 
Crimea to the Russian Federation go against international law" (Smith et al. 2014). This 
statement was made in the aftermath of the imposition of sanctions by the EU on March 17, 2017 
which composed of "the first travel bans and asset freezes against Russian and Ukrainian 
officials.''
13
 These sanctions can be understood as "a type of economic isolation largely unseen 
since the Soviet era'' (Sonne et al. 2014). Russia itself was pursing policies being far from 
benevolent. Before the Ukraine crisis Russia levelled accusations and expressed discontent 
mostly in a verbal manner, whereas as the tensions intensified between Russia and the EU the 
former started to rely on practical means as well.  
                                                          
13
 "EU Sanctions against Russia over Ukraine Crisis." EUROPA available at 
<http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm>. h27 
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First, the state-owned Gazprom announced in the first quarter of 2014 that it would not extend 
discounts on gas prices (Figure 7) supplied to Ukraine (Aleksashenko 2014). On top of that, in 
April 2014 Ukraine lost the 100 dollar discount due to Russia's abolishment of the agreement on 
the Black Sea Float and as a result " the price of gas for Ukraine in the second quarter of 2014 
should have been 485 dollars per bcm based on 2009 agreement" (Aleksashenko 2014). Gazprom 
further pressured Ukraine whose debts had grown to 4.45 billion USD announcing in June 2014 
that it would supply gas to Ukraine on a prepayment system basis only (ibid.).  
 Figure 7: Price of Russian gas for Ukraine, Germany, and the Baltic States ($/MmBTU) 
 
      Source: Aleksashenko, Sergei. "Is There a Solution?" 22 July 2014. 
Second, a 400 billion USD agreement (Figure 8) between Gazprom and the China National 
Petroleum Company was the result of negotiations between Russian President Vladimir Putin 
and Chinese leader Xi Jinping in May 2014 (Jenkins 2014).  
               Figure 8: Russia-China Gas deal 
 
   Source: RT 
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This deal, if implemented, on the one hand decreases Russia's dependence on revenues from 
exports to EU; on the other hand, it makes China the largest consumer of Russia's gas and, opens 
the market to energy-dependent Japan (Jenkins 2014). However, more importantly it diversifies 
Russia energy exports and gives her extra leverage in playing its energy card (ibid.).   
Third, on 7 August 2014 Russia took revenge and banned the imports of a wide range of food 
products from several countries, including the EU, for the imposition of sanctions on her (Sonne 
et al. 2014, Smith 2014). The representatives of the Russian Federation also announced that it 
might restrict EU airlines to use her airspace for flights to Asia (The Guardian Sept. 2014).  
Finally, the most striking policy Russia pursued which could be indicative of a clear trend of 
reorientation and reevaluation of relations was the cancellation of the South Stream pipeline 
(Figure 9) deal on 2 December 2014 (Thorpe 2014, Stratfor 2014). Instead of supplying gas 
directly to southeastern European countries, namely Bulgaria, Hungary and Serbia, Russia 
announced it would construct a pipeline to Turkey (Aris 2014). To summarize, the general trend 
in Russia-EU relations irrespective of their interdependence is moving towards a worsening of 
relations between these legal identities creating tensions and disorder in European region which 
is destructive for socio-economic and political stability of the region.   
  Figure 9: South Stream Project  
 
   Source: Stern et al. "Does the Cancellation of South Stream Signal a Fundamental                          
     Reorientation of Russian Gas Export Policy?" 2015:7 
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Apart from the strategies and approaches Russia adopted, it is also important to look at political 
leaders' perceptions of exogenous challenges. Straight after the presidential elections of 2012, 
Russian President said that "political provocations aimed at only one thing: to destroy Russian 
statehood and usurp power" cannot be used to deceive the Russian population (The Economist 
05 March 2012). Then, while speaking at the international conference on European security on 
23 May 2013, Vladimir Putin urged other countries to join forces to fight global threats in the 
form of "increasing instability in several neighbouring regions, the growing dangers of 
international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and drug trafficking" (The 
Kremlin 23 May 2013). However, on 15 July 2014 he warned that "Any attempts to create a 
model of international relations where all decisions are made within a single 'pole' are 
ineffective, malfunction regularly, and are ultimately set to fail." (The Kremlin 15 July 2014).  
 
Another perception of challenges was expressed on 18 December 2014, when the Russian 
President suggested that "attempts are clearly being made to destabilize the social and economic 
situation, to weaken Russia in one way or another or to strike at our weaker spots, and [the West] 
will continue primarily to make us more agreeable in resolving international issues (The Kremlin   
18 December 2014). Nikolai Patrushev, head of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, 
supported Vladimir Putin's statement saying on 10 February 2015 that "The Americans are trying 
to draw the Russian Federation into an interstate military conflict, to achieve regime change 
through the events un Ukraine and to ultimately dismember our country" (Hille et al. 2015 h20). 
Therefore, on 16 March 2015 Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu emphasized that "New challenges 
and threats to military security require the armed forces to further boost their military 
capabilities" (Grove 2015 h20). 
 On 26 March 2015, Vladimir Putin reiterated his perceptions and said that ''[the West is] using 
their entire arsenal of means for the so-called deterrence of Russia: from attempts at political 
isolation and economic pressure to large-scale information war and special services operations… 
[in order] to discredit the authorities and destabilise the internal situation in Russia'' (The 
Kremlin 26 March 2015). However, he pointed out that "Russia will stand firm "in the West's 
attempt" to isolate the country politically and pressurize its economy" (Fox News 26 March 
2015). Nevertheless, Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev admitted that sanctions had a significant 
negative impact on Russia's economy (Roth 2015). In addition, he said that despite low oil 
prices, ''the unprecedented external political and economic pressure'', such as EU sanctions, 
Russia's position about Crimea remains the same and Russians are ready to bear the costs (ibid.). 
The Russian general public's reaction to events such as the 2012 presidential elections in Russia, 
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Crimea's acceptance, and Western sanctions are touched upon in detail in the following 
paragraph. 
Evans (2012: 239) indicates that the political leadership has a strong grip on institutions, namely 
political parties and legislative bodies which makes it difficult for the general population to 
express their complaints and disagreements with policies their state pursues. Indeed, the rate of 
Russian government accountability in 2012 was -0.98 (Table 6). It got worse in 2013 and 
decreased to -1.01 (Table 6) which mirrors the consolidation of semi-authoritarian regime's 
control of the channels through which domestic constituencies expresses their discontent (ibid). 
    
Table 6. Russian government accountability 2012-2014 
Year 2012 2013 2014 
Indicator  -0.98* -1.01 N/a 
    *( -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance) 
 Source: Table based on data obtained from The Worldwide Governance   
    Indicators (WGI) 2014.  
Likewise, Russia performed badly from Transparency International ratings' viewpoint scoring 28 
in the Corruption Perception indices and was ranked 133 relative to other countries in 2012 
(Table 7). Whereas its score remained at the same level in 2013, in relation to other countries, its 
ranking was improved and shifted by 6 points to 127 (Table 7). However, in 2014 its perceived 
level of public corruption fell to 27 and therefore Russia was in 136
th
 position among other 
countries (Table 7).   
Table 7. Corruption Perception Indices 2012-2014 
Year 2012 2013 2014 
Score 28* 28 27 
Rank  133** 127 136 
* A country/territory’s score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0-100, where 0 
means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and a 100 means that a country is perceived as very clean. 
** A country's rank indicates its position relative to the other countries/territories included in the index. 
Source: Table based on data obtained from the Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, 2013, 
   2014.  
Despite the low level of government accountability and also scoring at the bottom of the 
Corruption Perception Indices, the Russian general public's reaction towards the Russian 
political elite's strategies, including the Ukraine crisis were primarily supportive. Although some 
Russians question the clarity of the 2012 presidential elections, Vladimir Putin enjoys high 
public support (PewResearchCenter 22 May 2012).  
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When Russian leaders approved the plan about Crimea becoming a subject of the Russian 
Federation, 94% of the population expressed their support (Minina 2014, Scherlok 2014). 
Volkov (2014) demonstrates that in January 2014 Putin's personal ratings rose from around 65% 
to 80 straight after Crimea became a part of Russia and continued growing to 88% at the end of 
the year. Kolonitskii (2014) suggests that what the West did overlook is the fact that even 
"intelligent critics of Putin support his Ukrainian policy." However, it is important to draw a 
distinction between the President's support and approval of military intervention and the 
escalation of situation in Ukraine. Sherlock (2014) notices that the majority of the Russian 
population is against military intervention. Bell (2014) disagrees with Sherlock stating that there 
is almost an equal division between Russian society whether to support the military intervention 
in Eastern Ukraine or not with 41% for and 43% against, respectively. Trenin (2015) emphasizes 
that while the Russian political elite have been enjoying stable public support since 2012 soaring 
to peaks in recent years, the opposition remains very weak. He states that "Opposition …was 
occasionally visible in the streets, but essentially impotent, lacking broad popular support" 
(ibid.).  
 
Bakunina lends support to this argument stating that even "the assassination of Boris Nemtsov, a 
Russian opposition politician" did not instigate the civil disobedience (Bakunina 2015, Harding 
2015: 7). This as she say is due to the fact that "Like any other opposition leader in Russia, he 
was a scribble on the margin of current affairs" (ibid.). Moreover, she argues that ''The 
overwhelming majority of the Russian population supports the country's president, Vladimir 
Putin" (ibid.). Her statement is supported by figures from a poll conducted in the first quarter of 
2015 in which more than one half of the population is in favour of Russia's polices and 86% 
support the country's president (ibid.). The evidence of high domestic approval could be found in 
the most recent event held at the anniversary of Crimea's acceptance in which Russians 
expressed their support in the form of marching the streets of Moscow and attending a concert 
close to the Kremlin (Birnbaum et al. 2015). Overall, this part of the thesis provided information 
about, first, Russia's economic and military power, measured through GDP, hydrocarbon prices 
and the defense budget, respectively; second, the Russian political leaders' public statements 
concerning their perceptions of exogenous challenges; finally, government accountability, the 
assessment of the level of corruption as well as public reactions to events between 2012 and 
2015 were discussed.  In the following section the evaluation of the findings presented in this 
part is carried out. 
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3.2. Evaluation 
In this section the evaluation of the findings illustrated in the previous chapter is carried out. 
Before moving to the discussion of the main drivers of Russia's foreign policies, the importance 
of Russian President in generating foreign policy is examined. Next, in this part of the thesis I 
analyze which independent variables in my opinion had a greater impact on Russia's strategies.  
It is beyond dispute that a formal right to set the country's foreign policy in the Russian 
Federation belongs to the Russian President. It is evident from the analysis of the Constitution in 
which this right is specifically highlighted. Moreover, Biliana's (2014: 180) finding that the 
MFA has been given just administrative functions and implements policies generated in the 
presidential apparatus is another proof. Therefore, Vladimir Putin set the course Russia would be 
leading for the next 6 years after the 2012 presidential elections, namely to secure sovereignty 
and promote its image on the international stage as representing an authoritative and influential 
actor in international affairs (Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2013). More 
importantly, to accomplish its core interests that is maintaining Russia's sphere of influence in 
the post-Soviet space in order to project itself as at least a regional power (Leichtova 2014: 7, 
Hancock 2007: 94, Fetisova 2012). Positive indicators of the economy supported this attempt. 
Examining hydrocarbon prices (Table 2 & 3), which account substantial revenues for Russia, it 
can be noticed that they remained relatively high till the end of 2014. This in turn rendered the 
Russian Economy, its GDP in particular, wealthier before a sharp decline at the end of 2014 
(Table 4). This decline is highly likely to be explained by both EU sanctions and gas and oil 
prices drop. However, instead of restraining herself from deteriorating relations, it was in 2014 
when she pursued the most assertive policies.  
First, it stands to reason that an increase in gas prices (Figure 4) helped to generate a policy in 
which Russia used its economic power to increase its leverage over Ukraine and made the 
Ukrainian government more resilient. Russia knew very well that since Ukraine is heavily 
dependent on energy supplies from Russia rising gas prices would only exacerbate Ukraine's 
precarious situation making it more indebted and vulnerable to exogenous factors. In addition, it 
would make it more difficult for the EU to intervene and assist Ukraine in alleviating the 
predicament. Russia justified this action, namely an increase in gas prices for a country in a state 
of crisis as purely economically driven and lacking any political motivation (The Kremlin 4 
March 2014). 
Second, the acceptance of Crimea as a subject of the Russian Federation can be viewed as a 
hard-line policy as well. Although Russia stated that she fulfilled and respected the right of the 
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Crimeans to self-determination, the underlying motives of this policy is far-reaching. It is 
certainly true that the overthrow of pro-Russian president Viktor Janukovich and establishment 
of anti-Russian government backed by the West diminished Russia's sphere of influence and 
deprived her of the ability to exert influence on the Ukrainian government. Nevertheless, by 
joining the Crimean peninsula Russia, on the one hand, increased its economic power  as it 
acquired vast amounts of offshore fossil fuel reserves beneath the Black Sea bed (Umbach 
2015); on the other hand, it secured the position of her Black Sea fleet's base in Crimea and 
eliminated any practical chance of NATO's expansion in the Black Sea.   
Third, the deal between Gazprom and the China National Petroleum Company, which Russia 
procrastinated about for many years, was signed when the Ukraine crisis was far from being 
resolved. If signed, this deal will give Russia an opportunity to diversify its energy capabilities. 
When asked whether "energy diplomacy has become a key factor in geopolitics" and the Russia-
China gas deal represents a reorientation from the West to the East, Russian President Vladimir 
Putin replied that it is partly true and this policy has to do more with economic aspects rather 
than political due to a striking pace of the Asia-Pacific region development (The Kremlin 18 
December 2014).  It also sent a strong signal to the EU, which is heavily dependent on Russian 
gas, that Russia is turning its energy strategy eastwards and EU should started looking for new 
exporters if she wants to preserve its energy security. It is highly likely that Russia will gain 
more leverage over the EU if the latter does not find alternative sources of energy supplies. As a 
result, EU will have to make more concessions to please Russia's demands therefore increasing 
its role and potential in European region.  
Fourth, the Russian embargo on EU food products in August 2014 was a clear policy of revenge 
for sanctions which the latter had imposed on Russia earlier that year. Although Russia justified 
this policy claiming that this embargo will have a positive effect on Russia's producers and the 
general public will also benefit from low prices, this action demonstrated Russia's unwillingness 
to make any concessions and readiness to pay the high prices for its hard-line policies. It also 
demonstrated that Russia will not change its policies in the Ukraine crisis and continue to 
accomplish the objectives it set such as remaining a key actor in influencing Ukrainian affairs. 
Finally, the decision that has the potential of changing dynamics of energy security in the EU 
was Russia's cancellation of the South Stream gas project (Stratfor 2014). On the one hand, it 
was relief for the EU as Russia would have exerted more influence on South Eastern members of 
the EU by offering tempting deals which could have weakened EU's bargaining power in 
different negotiations (Aris 2014). On the other hand, the abandonment of this project 
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empowered Turkey by making it a crucial player in energy supply and having leverage in the 
provision of the EU's energy security (Stratfor 2014). This policy stemmed from existing 
tensions between the EU and Russia, and its adoption demonstrated to the former one more time 
that Russia still remains a crucial energy supplier and it shapes energy security of the region in a 
way that most appeases its core national interests.  
It is beyond dispute that the acceptance of Crimea benefited Russia in terms of obtaining 
hydrocarbon reserves but it would be wrong to neglect its military power's projection as one of 
the driving forces behind such policy. Russia constantly funded its defense budget and not 
surprisingly is the third top state with highest defense budget which allows her to pursue hard-
line policies. The thousands of soldiers that were deployed in the period of the outbreak of the 
Ukrainian crisis were decisive and contributed to a great extent to the realization of Russia's 
objectives. Securing the positions of Russia's fleet in the Black Sea and the elimination of any 
future prospects of Crimea becoming a NATO troop base, consolidated Russia's security in its 
Southern borders. Furthermore, it is a well known fact that the Black Sea gives access to the 
Mediterranean Sea and further to the Atlantic Ocean. Losing the Crimean peninsula would have 
weakened Russia national security both regionally and internationally. Having said that, 
warnings to use nuclear weapons in the wake of Crimea's takeover if Russian armed forces 
attacked seems realistic taking into account Russia's high stakes in the Ukraine crisis. 
National security concerns can be one of the reasons if not the main one why Russia adopted 
such hard-line policies.  The political leaders' perceptions of external challenges may throw light 
and make the picture more transparent. Vladimir Putin on the very next day after the 2012 
presidential elections made a statement that the number one external challenge Russia should 
fight is the desire of outside actors to divide Russia and seize power. His statement at the 
international conference on European security on 23 May 2013 can be interpreted as an attempt 
to offer Western partners to team up in order to fight the burning issues of the contemporary 
international environment. However, Russia changed its rhetoric in 2014. President Putin's 
speech on 18 March 2018 can be viewed as an indicator of changing perceptions. He noticed that 
the West did not respect international institutions and made attempts to destabilise countries 
adjacent to Russia. He also said that the overthrow of Viktor Janukovich was against Russia 
which is an indicator of the Russian political leaders' perception that the West makes constant 
effort to change the regime in the Russian Federation itself. This argument was publicly 
expressed by Nikolai Patrushev, head of the Security Council of the Russian Federation on 10 
February 2015. 
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Furthermore, he emphasized that NATO's expansion in Eastern Europe is interpreted by Russia 
as a threat to its national security. Bock et al. lend support to this argument stating that "Moscow 
perceives Western political and military expansion (i.e. the admission of East European states in 
the EU and especially into NATO), as well as defence measures taken by NATO allies (i.e., 
missile defence), as clear, immediate, and vital threats to Russia's national security" (2015: 102). 
However, Bilyana puts forward the idea that by condemning NATO's expansion in Eastern 
European countries Russia wanted to "project influence and power abroad'' as well as "its own 
standing power on the world stage and its ability to control domestic and regional events" (2014: 
327).  Overall, the hard-line policies Russia pursued to change the situation in its favour may be 
the  result of the changing political elite's perceptions of external challenges which could have a 
negative impact on Russia's national security and its political leadership. Russian leaders 
perceived that attempts made by the West in recent years implied the weakening of Russia both 
militarily and economically in order to diminish its capabilities and potential on the global stage 
as well as deprive the semi-authoritarian regime of its monopoly on power and subsequently 
overthrow it.  
Despite all external hurdles, Russia managed to withstand these attempts and secured its position 
at least regionally. In order to accomplish this the Russian government was able to extract and 
mobilise all the resources assumed by neoclassical realists to be indispensible for the realization 
of policies. The general public could have been an obstacle but as it is evident from the findings 
discussed in the previous section quite the polar opposite was true. Not only did the Russian 
population welcome the acceptance of the Crimean peninsula, but it also enhanced its faith in the 
Russian President as the protector of their interests and the guarantor of maintaining Russian 
integrity and sovereignty. Moreover, Russians have always seen Crimea as unjustly taken from 
them and do not accept the West's condemnation. They view Western sanctions as unfair and an 
attempt to deprive them of the relative affluence lives they have been experiencing since Putin's 
coming to power (Trenin 2015).  
It is interesting to note that while the government accountability was getting lower and Russia 
scored nearly at the bottom in the Corruption Perception indices, the general public has become 
more supportive of their country's course of actions. The very fact that the assassination of the 
opposition leader in February 2015 did not cause any civil unrest can mean that there are not any 
real forces domestically that could counter and disagree with the current political regime's 
decisions and policies (Gil 2015: 102). To summarize, the general public is in favour of its state's 
policies and is continuing to support the regime however brutal in the West's opinion it might be. 
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Furthermore, the lack of any sort of opposition allows the Russian political leaders to hold a 
strong grip on internal affairs and exploit all the resources at their disposal.  
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Chapter 4 
Final Remarks 
4.1. Conclusion 
In this thesis I carried out a study in Russia's foreign policy between March 2012 and April 2015. 
This period covers volatile changes in the European region including the worst crisis between 
Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War. Given Europe's history of destructive past 
conflicts and Russia's status as a nuclear superpower who feels increasingly encircled by 
Western expansion, it is perhaps unsurprising that many authors feel that the current stand-off 
between the EU and Russia is a cause of deep concern. My unit of analysis in this period was 
Russia and I studied its conduct per se rather than the analysis of its relations with the EU. I 
examined whether policies generated in this period, during the Ukraine crisis in particular, led to 
a reorientation and reevaluation of relations between Russia and the EU. It is widely accepted 
that strategies adopted by the Russian leadership were detrimental both to Russia's image on the 
international arena as well as its economy. A key social science theory, namely NCR, laid the 
basis for such an examination as an effective tool for the analysis of different levels. It also was 
an invaluable instrument for first, identifying variables to be operationalized and, second, 
examining the driving forces behind Russia's foreign policy. In addition, NCR assisted in the 
formulation and answering of the main research question as well as testing the hypotheses. 
In my opinion, security concerns were one of the driving forces behind Russia's foreign policy 
between 2012 and 2015. Ukraine presents a post-Soviet space and it is specifically formulated in 
the Russian Federation Military Doctrine
14
 that the preservation of the sphere of influence over 
the former Soviet Union members is a core interest of the Russian Federation. Russia interpreted 
the loss of Ukraine as endangering its national security and weakening its power both regionally 
and internationally. Thus, the first hypothesis that greater economic and military power urges 
Russia to pursue more assertive policies can be partly supported. It is certainly true that Russia 
utilized its economic power in terms of its energy card but being one of the major military 
powers plays a greater role in pursuing hard-line policies. Jankowaski stresses that "The military 
remains a key pillar of Russia's foreign policy" (2015: 26).  
The second hypothesis that the Russian political elite perceives the interference of other 
countries into its sphere of influence as a threat to her national security and therefore pursues 
hard-line policies can be supported. The Russian political leadership carefully filtered systemic 
                                                          
14
" The Russian Federation Military Doctrine" available at 
http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf 
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factors in the form of challenges created by Western counterparts and claimed that the backup of 
the coup in Ukraine, which Russian leaders view as their sphere of influence, represent a real and 
not an illusory threat to Russia's national security. Therefore, they are ready to pursue policies 
however assertive and self-destructive they might seem even to the extent of the use of nuclear 
weapons.  
The third hypothesis that the Russian low government accountability allows her to exert great 
influence on its general public and therefore pursue hard-line policies cannot be either supported 
or rejected. In the case of the Ukraine crisis the domestic constituency supported the actions of 
its government and therefore it is difficult to determine whether public support or government 
control of public played a decisive role in pursuing hard-line policies. 
Overall, it is clear that Russia and the EU are on a collision course. It can be said that the Russia-
China gas deal, the cancellation of the South Stream gas project, to name but a few paves a way 
towards a reevaluation and reorientation of Russo-EU relations. With Russia increasingly 
aligning itself with Asian countries rather than the EU, it is highly likely that conflict in the 
European region intensifies. Russia's extra leverage in its energy diplomacy due to the probable 
absence of dependence on the revenues from exports to the EU, is bound to make it a more 
influential actor in that region by forcing the energy-dependent EU to make compromises and 
meeting Russia's core interests requirements. Nevertheless, it is still too early to draw a firm 
conclusion since the Ukraine crisis is still ongoing at time of writing this thesis making it nearly 
impossible to predict whether Russia will do a U-turn from the East to the West given its 
damaged relations with the EU will improve.  
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4.2. Limitations 
This thesis has several limitations. A key limitation of this thesis is that the examination of 
Russian foreign policy has been carried out during the Ukraine crisis in process. Since the crisis 
is still ongoing it would be more beneficial to analyze Russian foreign policy when the crisis has 
ended. Furthermore, studying a phenomenon which already occurred may provide a researcher 
with an opportunity to acquire more reliable data as they will examine course of actions Russia 
already adopted. Therefore, it is possible that the conclusions drawn in this thesis may be 
misleading and factors identified were not necessarily the determinants of Russia's conduct. 
The second limitation is the political elite's perceptions. For the researcher, it is extremely 
difficult to fully grasp the full scope of perceptions which influence the decisions of the political 
elite. Perhaps at best, we can only have a partial understanding of such perceptions as a result of 
the fact that we do not have full access to every form of discussion that goes on at the highest 
levels of government. The problem is compounded when we consider that public statements 
made by officials often aim at disguising their true motivations in order to accomplish their plans 
and strategies while at the same time gaining public support. However, this effort to disguise the 
full picture does not change the fact that a state's foreign policy is generated by political leaders 
interpreting the challenges of a contemporary environment which has a basis in the real world in 
which there is both conflict and cooperation. In other words, at the heart of political decision-
making there are individuals who create policies based on individual evaluations of structures 
and processes. 
 So although the researcher could not possibly have a complete understanding of the political 
elite's perceptions, he was aware of the assumptions within NCR theory that foreign policy is 
heavily influenced by intervening variables such as the perceptions of political elites. For 
example, Russia still wants to be viewed as an important player in the international environment 
capable of controlling events at the domestic, regional and international level. This can explain 
why she is so fiercely determined to control its sphere of influence while expressing to be 
concerned about security issues. This may be exacerbated by the fact Russia is still suffering 
from the break-up of the Soviet Union and its leaders can be perceived to be experiencing a form 
of post-imperial syndrome in which there is a feeling of hurt and humiliation for the loss of 
respect and might of their country (Samokysh 2014).  
However, the researcher is aware of that fact that interpreting such perceptions is difficult and 
can present ambiguous results. Thus, when conducting research in future it is vital to study this 
variable more extensively in order to correctly identify the factors that have a direct impact on it. 
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This in turn will allow to gather more reliable data and avoid misinterpretation of findings which 
could lead to misleading conclusions. Last but not least, is attributed to the measurement of 
Russia's economic power and its role in forming different strategies. The operationalization of 
GDP is not sufficient in explaining Russia's use of its economic power. Similarly, hydrocarbon 
prices just indicated the overall trend of the energy markets. The measurement of other indicators 
is necessary to determine how Russia uses its economic power in generating its foreign policy. 
Energy diplomacy, for instance, measured via gas and oil contracts entered into, seems a better 
indicator of Russia's use of its economic power in its foreign policy behaviour and therefore 
should be analyzed more thoroughly. 
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4.3. Implications 
There are several theoretical and practical implications that can be inferred from this thesis 
however complex the study of a state's foreign policy might be. From a theoretical perspective, 
this study underpinned some of the NCR theory's assumptions especially in regard with political 
leader's perceptions of external challenges that a state generates foreign policy once systemic 
factors have been filtered via the decision-makers' perceptions. On the contrary, I was not able to 
prove NCR's assumptions concerning the mobilisation and extraction of resources due to the fact 
that the general public was not against chosen strategies. Therefore, the theory may benefit if 
neoclassical realists elaborate more on circumstances in which a semi-authoritarian regime's 
policies are not upheld by the local constituency. Likewise, scholars could narrow down the 
variables which are operationalized contingent to country. The resource extraction might be 
easier in a country whose government is less constrained by the general public. On the other 
hand, advanced institutions might support the political leader in solving this obstacle by having 
better control of the public's needs.  
Practical implications can be as follows. It is necessary to avoid the assistance of the government 
transition when a more stronger neighbour's interests are concerned. On the one hand, it 
instigates a crisis draining in the general public which bears the highest costs of the conflict in 
the form of worsening relations between compatriots and nations. On the other hand, it poses a 
threat to international peace and security which is indispensible in times of acute international 
problems such as international terrorism which no nation can solve on its own. In order to avoid 
such crises it is necessary to mitigate national security concerns by inviting parties affected to the 
table where they will be able to express their opinion and offer their solutions to existing 
problems. 
Overall, NCR theory throws light in the study of Russian foreign policy and assists researchers 
in informing Russian political debates and policies since its assumptions lay the basis for a 
framework in which the examination is conducted at multiple levels and intervening variables, 
namely political leader's perceptions and ability to extract local resources play a decisive role in 
formulation a state' foreign policy.   
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